Moral Discourse as Resource of Publicity: Religious and Secular Alternatives by Stepanova, E.
ISPS Convention 2017
Convention 2017 “Modernization and Multiple Modernities”
Volume 2018
Conference Paper
Moral Discourse as Resource of Publicity:
Religious and Secular Alternatives
Elena Stepanova
Institute of Philosophy and Law, Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Ekaterinburg,
Russia
Abstract
In recent years, the defense of traditional values became one of the soundest
strategies of religious authorities, as well as political powers in Russia. The author
observes main arguments in the debates on traditional values presented by the
hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church and political leaders, and figures out
basic principles of the discourse: the “continuity” of the core values of Russian
culture through its history; the opposition of Russia and “The West” as a significant
reference point, which seems to be a recurrent thing in Russian identity building; the
indissoluble link between [traditional] religion and morality. The author concludes
that significant shortcoming of the ideology of traditional values is that they exist
only on a discursive level, not manifesting themselves in everyday moral practices,
although should contribute to the formation of national identity. Hence, the ‘traditional
values’ discourse is aimed at the cohering the nation around certain meanings that
are assumed as obtaining both historical and ideological integrity.
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1. Introduction
The discourse of traditional values occupies a place of honor in today’s Russia, being
an important source of forming new ideological consensus. Since the first half of the
2000s, it is possible to discern a gradual transformation of the ideological atmosphere
in Russia, which could be defined as “the morality turn” [4]. The leading hierarchs of
the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as one of so-called ‘traditional religions’ has been
deeply involved in the debates on the role and place of traditional values in national
identity of Russia’s past and present, as well as in the discussion concerning the ROC’s
attitude toward other nations, religions, cultures, and morals. Thus, in recent years,
the ROC has become an active promoter of ‘traditional values’ both inside Russia and
internationally.
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The influence of the Orthodox interpretation of traditional values over wider public
should not be underestimated since a considerable number of Russians see religion
(Orthodoxy in particular) as a cultural symbol of the country and ready-made tool
for teaching morality. In other words, “morality seems to be the most natural and
convenient discursive space in which a religious body can contribute to public debates.
It is the field in which communication and negotiation between the religious and the
secular can easily take place and in which ‘comprehensive doctrines’ can be translated
into a commonly detectable language” ([2], 3). At the same time, the ROC tends to
attribute herself an exclusive role in the sphere of culture and morality. According to
Igumen Philip (Ryabykh), “Today religions try to preserve their freedom not only in an
exclusive way, by claiming that some norms may not apply to religious communities,
but they also insist on their right to contribute to the shaping of general norms that
apply to the whole of society.” ([10], 23). Kristina Stoeckl stresses that it is typical for
the defenders of moral traditionalism to be involved into public debates thus becoming
political actors [13].
The idea of an indissoluble link between [traditional] religion andmorality is strongly
supported by the Russian political powers, which tend to delegate the responsibility
for moral improvement of Russian people to religious institutions. As a result, in recent
decades, the religiosity and moral traditionalism’s alliance has substantially increased.
Thus, religion in Russia “now became a direct, unhampered source of morality. It would
be a gross exaggeration to say that in today’s Russia religion defines the popular ethos;
however, it unquestionably amajor factor not only for thosewho regularly practice and
observe religion, but it is also an important and esteemed reference point for amassive
part of the non-religious population’ ([1], 17)
2. The Score of Traditional Values and
Basic Principles of Their Defense
What do the ROC authorities mean by traditional values, and what are their origins?
Patriarch Kirill lists the universal values of ‘faith, love, duty, responsibility, solidarity’.
From his perspective, these eternal values are not the product of the historical evo-
lution, and they do not depend on particular socio-cultural conditions; they are not
created by people, but are embedded into the human nature by God. These values
are not particularly Christian, because they are built into the structure of the universe
and traced back to the first steps of the humankind. Kirill insists: “We [Russians] share
these values with many morally healthy people who do not consider themselves as
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adherents of any religion and live according to the law of conscience”. Accordingly, the
rejection of traditional values leads to the destruction of human beings and society [6].
President of Russia Vladimir Putin during his third turn seems to shift from the initial
refrain from the official state ideology toward the promotion of the new national
ideological consensus based on the moralistic approach, which includes traditional
values as its core element. In the annual Presidential Address to the Federal Assem-
bly in December 2013, Putin promised to defend traditional values “that have made
up the spiritual and moral foundation of civilization in every nation for thousands of
years: the values of traditional families, real human life, including religious life, not just
material existence but also spirituality, the values of humanism and global diversity”
[9]. In Putin’s interpretation, traditional values have transcendent character; they are
understood in an essentialist way as eternal and unchangeable, thus being applicable
not only to Russia but to other countries as well. In addition, the reference to “every
nation for thousands of years” indicates that Putin’s message is addressed not just to
the Russian citizens, but also to more and more people in the world who support his
position.
It is important to note that for both Putin and Kirill, the scale of traditional values
is much wider than the opposition to same-sex marriages, the LGBT agenda, and the
defense of traditional family (although all this themes are constantly present in the
rhetoric of both religious and secular defenders of traditional values). Generally, tradi-
tional values are interpreted as the ultimate moral foundation of human life. Both sec-
ular and religious protagonists of traditional values use to place them within broader
context – namely, the distinctiveness of the Russian culture and religion comparing
with European countries and the USA,which are generalized as ‘theWest’. The picturing
of Russia as the world’s last bastion of the defense of traditional values is an integral
part of the idea of the ongoing conflict between two opposite civilizations: Western
(secular) and Orthodox (genuine Christian), where the former stands for liberalism,
secularism, and individualism, while the latter represents traditionalism, moralism,
religion and community [12]. The idea of Russia as a separate civilization presupposes
that tradition is the way to preserve the nation’s culture, which must be protected from
foreign influences. The ROC as protagonist of traditional values views Russia as a great
nation with an exclusive divine appointment to defend Christian civilization as such.
Thus, for the first time since the collapse of Marxism-Leninism, Russia is offering the
world a narrative that goes beyond its national specificities, has universal value, and
thus can be accepted, integrated, and reinterpreted in other contexts [4].
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What does tradition mean in both the today’s Orthodox and secular rhetoric? In the
Orthodox discourse, it means the ecclesiastic canonical tradition, the Predanie (Greek
paradosis), which signifies the inherited sum of texts, ideas, norms and customs [2].
According to Patriarch Kirill, ‘for the Orthodox Christian, tradition is a set of creedal
and moral truths that the Church has accepted from the testimony of the Apostles and
which it has guarded and developed as a function of the historical circumstances’ ([5],
3). In a secular sense, tradition has been mainly associated with morality.
The discourse of traditional values is based on certain principles [11]. The first is
the adjustment of the past to the current political and ideological needs. The overall
principle of the symbolic appropriation of the past – the “continuity” – was proclaimed
by Vladimir Putin in the annual Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly in Decem-
ber 2012: “We need to link historical eras and get back to understanding the simple
truth that Russia did not begin in 1917 or even in 1991, but rather, that we have a
common, continuous history spanning over 1000 years and we must rely on it to find
inner strength and purpose in our national development” [8]. The Orthodox version
of the principle of ‘continuity’ is based on the combination of tradition and Predanie.
It constitutes the Russian nation in opposition to the Western liberalism, which brings
‘the expansion of alien, destructive social and cultural factors…, and the new way of
life that is arising and taking shape outside of any tradition under the influence of
today’s post-industrial world’ ([5], 6). Thus, according to the principle of ‘continuity’,
the core values of the Russian culture remain unchanged through its history despite
radical breaks with tradition. Thereby, traditional values obtain the qualities of eternity
and consistency; they provide “continuity” and do not depend on caprices of history.
The second principle is the opposition of Russia and “The West” as a significant
reference point, which seems to be a recurrent thing in Russian identity building. Thus,
Putin constantly underlines the antithetical opposition between liberal tolerance and
secularism of the West and morality and organic unity of Russia. He argues that that
many Euro-Atlantic countries have moved away from their roots, including Christian
values and traditional identities. In opposition to European countries, Putin confirms
that defending traditional values “is absolutely objective and understandable for a
state like Russia with its great history and culture, with many centuries of experience,
not so-called tolerance neutered and barren, but the actual common natural life of
different peoples within the framework of a single state” [9].
As for Patriarch Kirill, ‘the most fundamental conflict of our present era is the clash
between the liberal model of civilization on the one hand and national, cultural and
religious identity, on the other’ [5]. Kirill argues that secular liberalism supports the
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idea of emancipation of the sinful individual who rejects anything that binds him and
prevents from the affirmation of his sinful self. Human freedom becomes a supreme
value, but only as a freedom of choice. The situation when each person is free to deter-
mine the scale of moral values, on which he or she relies, leads to a radical rejection of
normative values. According to Kirill, the principal aim of the West is to expel religion
from society and to diminish the influence of religion on people’s behavior and life.
The principle of “continuity” seems to be more complex in the Russian Orthodox
interpretation of the history of Russia then in the secular one. Themain ambiguity is the
understanding of the Soviet period, which is estimated as ‘godless and god-fighting’,
being the period of history when the Russian Orthodox Church had suffered from state
repressions more than anybody else. In fact, the atheistic Soviet state was not friendly
toward religion; indeed, it could be hostile. Nevertheless, it seems that for the ROC’s
leaders ‘continuity’ as the ideological principle surmounts the breaks. Paradoxically,
the very reference to the ‘godless’ Soviet power, which has put the Church into a
humiliating and dependent status, as well as the experience of the survival, ensures
the symbolic right of the Church to serve as the sole depositary of the spiritual heritage
of the Russian people. The ‘godless’ Soviet power proves the ROC’s trustworthiness in
the times of “the monstrous experiment”, and allows it to function as an intermedium
of “continuity” [11].
At the same time, the ROC has assumed some substantial elements of the late
Soviet ethos in the sphere of morality [7]. As Alexander Agadjanian notes, the affinity
between the Orthodox moral didactic and the late Soviet ethos “is largely based upon
a common negative assumption – namely, a rejection of the imagined ‘western liberal
ethos’… Such paradigmatic conservatism had been celebrated as constitutive to the
Russian civilization’s uninterrupted religious inheritance” ([2], 43).
It seems that the conviction of the inseparable connection between religion and
morality is a relic of the Marxist-Leninist concept of society, with its division of social
life into a material and spiritual component and with the attribution of religion and
morality to the spiritual sphere. In the theological sense, the statement about the con-
nection between religion and morality is inorganic for the Orthodox tradition, rather, it
distinguished Western European Protestantism of the late XIX - early XX century with
the interpretation of Christ as the teacher of morality. Nevertheless, this statement
is very beneficial for Orthodoxy, acting as a means of legitimizing her social role in
modern Russia and at the same time allowing her to position herself before the West
as the guardian of an authentic Christian tradition.
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As for the concept of “the West” as the enemy, it is deeply embedded within Ortho-
dox self-consciousness and modes for self-expression. In the same way, in the Soviet
times, the West was described as inherently immoral capitalist system of exploitation,
thus affirming the moral superiority of the USSR. The comparison with the West is an
intrinsic part of both secular and religious statements concerning traditional values. It
seems that without referring to “the West” as enemy they would simply lose their
substance. Negative stereotypes and enemy images seems to be crucial for the Rus-
sian way of constructing national identity. The purpose of the image of “the West”
as an existential enemy is to strengthen Russia’s distinctiveness as the defender of
traditional values on behalf of the humankind, to mobilize the people of Russia, and to
unite them around political power and religious authorities, which guarantee security
and stability. In other words, the defense of traditional values is typically based on
the disclosure of an “enemy” and the threat that this enemy poses toward the main-
tenance of such values rather than on a demonstration of their merits; consequently,
the traditional values discourse lacks the necessary cogency to serve as a basis for
ideological consensus.
3. Traditional Values Versus Moral Autonomy
As it has been mentioned above, the defenders of traditional values contrapose the
“Western” concept of freedom as a freedom of choice to Russian idea of free embrace-
ment of the eternal moral truth preserved by tradition and supported by Orthodoxy.
The idea that the Western liberal understanding of freedom as arbitrariness opposes
the Orthodox concept of freedom as voluntary obedience to God’s truth is the basis
of Kirill’s critique of liberalism, which leads to “a radical rejection of the normative
significance of tradition, especially religious tradition, and to the absolute right of an
individual to determine what is good and what is evil” ([5], 11).
Indeed, the Western society of the era of modernity is associated with the idea of
moral autonomy of the individual and, accordingly, with the recognition of freedom of
choice as the main humanistic value. As the classics of Western sociology emphasized,
in traditional pre-modern society, morality was wholly based on religion and was
supported by collective representations that surpassed any individual ones. Morality
was perceived as something transcendent, as an attribute and emanation of the divine
principle, thereby appearing beyond criticism.Man carriedmoral obligations not before
other people, but before God (gods) and had to fulfill the rules prescribed from above.
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However, gradually relations between people became more complicated, and
human moral obligations became independent of religious grounds. The fact that
the moral norms in the past had a religious justification did not at all mean that they
could not now be expressed in any other way. Western society consistently got rid
of the idea of the sacred, quasi-religious nature of morality, finding in it what could
have been called by its own name and justified without resorting to a supernatural
beginning.
At the same time, the secularization of morality did not mean simply replacing
religious concepts with secular ones, because some moral ideas have merged so
much with religious ones that it became impossible to separate them from each
other. Rather, one could speak about gradual detection of moral principles hidden in
religious concepts. In the era of modernity, morality gradually became a condition for
the constitution of society as a system of relationships based on solidarity and the
harmonization of mutual interests. Thus, in a society of modernity, morality ceased to
be a once and for all established set of norms that have a sacred nature.
However, from the Orthodox point of view, the secular worldview of the present-
day society is destructive for morality, since it has introduced the image of a person
who is completely turned to the earthly world and is in captivity of his/her passions.
The common good, social solidarity and mutual assistance are secondary, because the
main thing is satisfaction of everyday needs and desires.
Thus, we have here two opposing positions inmany respects: if liberal social thought
regards morality as a product of personal autonomy and as a positive factor of social
development, then, according to the Orthodox point of view, absolutizing freedom of
choice destroys morality, turning it into an arbitrariness. In this contradiction, the natu-
ral discrepancy between secular and religious notions of morality is clearly manifested:
if the former by their nature admit moral pluralism as a consequence of personal
autonomy, the latter proceed from the absolutization of their own system of values,
which requires collective adherence.
The problem arises when a religious point of view claims to be an absolute truth
in a secular society. In this case, the religious institution appropriates power functions
and monopolizes the right to determine what is morally good, and what is not. Thus,
the traditional values of a particular religion become an ideology imposed from above
and does not require people to do anything but to agree with their authority. There is
a situation of ”compulsion to traditional values”, which is an obstacle to the transition
from declared values to the real everyday moral choice of a person, since it does not
require individual responsibility for decisions and deeds.
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It should be emphasized that moral consciousness as expression of autonomous
will can by no means be introduced from above, since in this case it is not a matter of
morality but of external compulsion to comply with conventional social norms. A moral
individual does not have to be a believer or an unbeliever, but he/she can be one or
the other in accordance with his/her free choice. In addition, the attribution of morality
to the competence of the Orthodox religion does not automatically contribute to the
emergence of a moral personality simply because most people in Russia perceive
Orthodoxy as a cultural symbol, which does not imply the personal moral choice.
A significant shortcoming of the ideology of traditional values is that they exist
only on a discursive level, not manifesting themselves in everyday moral practices;
although they are supposed to contribute into formation of national identity, continuity
in the course of social transformations and curing related traumas. The very presence
of the topic of traditional values in the public space of modern Russia testifies the
thirst for reliable value orientations that could give meaning to people’s lives. How-
ever, today the discourse of traditional values is either religious or secular form only
emphasizes the gap between the declarative values constantly spoken by political
and religious figures and the everyday moral values that determine the people’s life
practices.
4. Conclusion
In general, the concept of traditional values is used by both secular powers and reli-
gious authorities to ideologically consolidate Russian society, and at the same time to
recruite potential allies in the international arena.
Nevertheless, the presence of traditional values in Russian public discourse being a
significant resource of publicity reveals serious controversies in the search for a new
national identity, as well as the lack of any reliable common values that might give
meaning and structure to everyday life of citizens. The identity crisis that has persisted
in Russia since the disintegration of the Soviet Union with its system of collective
values and symbols is characterized by particularism – that is, by the multiplication of
identities (social, ethnic, family, etc.). Hence, the “traditional values” discourse is aimed
at the cohering the nation around certain meanings that are presented as having both
historical and ideological integrity. The question is whether this artificial construction
based on noncontroversial “continuity” of history and opposition to various “enemies”,
could be convincing enough for the Russian people.
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